Publications
Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense. Analysis (2021). (with Louis Doulas)
- We argue that Bryan Frances’s argument to the effect that philosophy can overturn common sense fails.
Under review
[On the epistemology of material objects]
- I argue that perceptual experience is a better basis for the epistemology of ontology than alternatives.
- I argue that metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical foundationalism are on a theoretical par.
[On whether we perceive incars]
- I argue that there are no extraordinary objects.
[On easy ontology and reference]
- I argue that easy ontology is either (i) a form of ontological eliminativism or (ii) a form of quantifier variance.
[On the phenomenology of object-experiences]
- I argue that our experiences around atoms arranged objectwise would be different if those atoms failed to compose an object.
- I argue that if our object beliefs have no defeaters, then ordinary objects exist “in reality”.
